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1. Introduction 
 
Slovenia successfully concluded accession negotiations with the EU in December 2002, 
along with other nine candidate countries. Results obtained on the financial issues for 
the period 2004-2006 revealed some official conclusions. First, the aims for the 
agriculture sector were fulfilled, i.e. the possibility for direct payments from own 
budget, the same level of direct payments from the year 2007 on, the production quotas 
not below the level of current production and financially very attractive solution for the 
rural development. Second, for the regional policy and structural funds Slovenia will 
receive 404 mill. of EUR, with the possibility for the further regionalization on the 
NUTS-2 level. Third, the EU will partially cover the costs (45% or 107 mill. EUR) of 
the construction and maintenance of the Schengen border. Fourth, regarding the 
transfers and the net budget position Slovenia succeeded to raise budgetary 
compensations from 45 mill. EUR in 2003 to 85 mill. EUR for each year within the 
2004-2006 period. Fifth, and finally, Slovenian net budgetary position will remain 
positive in the 2007-2013 period. 2
These conclusions should in fact demonstrate that for the financial part of 
negotiations Slovenia succeeded to achieve the best combination in order to fulfil two 
aims. Namely, the agreement with the EU should enable the continuation of the process 
of real convergence and should not worsen budgetary position and thus provide no 
additional difficulties with the fiscal part of Maastricht criteria. However, it is 
questionable whether all these very favourable official conclusions reflect reality, i.e. 
whether all effects of financial package were taken into account, whether all transfers 
between both budgets were estimated correctly and whether there are any other financial 
flows connected with the accession. 
  Within the article we will try to answer the questions above through the analysis of 
the continued foreign trade liberalization process, the official transfers between both 
budgets and some additional financial flows and effects on domestic budget. Namely, 
one should take into account decreased budget revenues due to the complete 
liberalization of trade with the EU and candidate countries as well as decreased 
efficiency of value added tax collection. And on the other hand, there will be additional 
transfers to the EU institutions and increased costs due to the preparation of Schengen 
border with Croatia. A partial equilibrium analysis will then be complemented with the 
general equilibrium simulation results in order to estimate more complex mutual effects 
at the aggregate and sectoral levels. 
  The outline of the article is as follows. In Chapter 2 a short description of the 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is presented. The process of further 
foreign trade liberalization in being analyzed in Chapter 3, together with the calculation 
of the average rates of collected import duties in the period 1998-2001 and after the 
accession to the EU. In Chapter 4 the Slovenian net budgetary position is analyzed, 
while in Chapter 5 some of the simulation results are presented. In the final chapter we 
summarize the central findings of the article. 
 
2. Description of the CGE model 
 
The static CGE model used (Majcen and Buehrer, 2001) is broadly based upon the 
model used in Buehrer (1994), augmented with data from the 1998 Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) and parameters from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model 
(Hertel, 1997). The basic structure of this model is similar to that used in many CGE 
models of developing countries (cf. Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson, 1991), previous 
models of Yugoslavia (Labus, 1990) and models of transition economies (Silver and 
Tesche, 1992). 
  Slovenia is treated as a small country in this model for purposes of both imports and 
exports. Given the focus of this exercise is on impacts on the Slovenian economy of 
joining the EU, trade with the EU in this model is separated from trade with the rest of 
the world. Output in the model is produced from a combination of capital, labour and 
intermediate goods by profit-maximizing enterprises. Since this is a short run model, 
firms are assumed to have a fixed stock of capital and there are decreasing returns to 
labour. Labour markets are assumed to be subject either to a fixed wage or a fixed 
supply of labour, depending on the simulation. Enterprises either sell their output 
domestically or to the international market. Domestic output is first transformed either 
into domestically used goods or aggregate exports, using a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function and the first order condition of profit maximization of 
the transformation function. Aggregate exports are then transformed into different 3
goods for the two foreign markets through another constant elasticity of transformation 
function and its first order condition. Prices for all exports are fixed in foreign exchange 
and export demand is assumed to be perfectly elastic. 
  Domestic consumption is met from a cost-minimizing mix of domestic and imported 
goods from the two regions. Aggregate imports are a cost minimizing combination of 
imperfectly substitutable imports from the ‘Rest of the World’ and from the EU. The 
substitution between imports from the EU and the ‘Rest of the World’ is modelled using 
constant elasticity of substitution functions. Domestically-produced aggregate imported 
goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes in consumption. In the model this is 
represented by equations, which are based on the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS; 
cf. Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980). Final domestic demand can take the form of 
intermediate goods, goods for household or government consumption or goods for 
investments in physical capital or inventories. 
  Once the allocation of demand between domestic output and imports in tradable 
sectors is determined, the price of composite domestic sales can be calculated. Given 
this price, the demands of the various actors in the economy for final output can be 
established. Households are assumed to spend fixed value shares of their disposable 
income to purchase goods from each sector. These shares are derived from a Cobb-
Douglas utility function. Disposable income is obtained as difference between the total 
household income and taxes at a tax rate, interest payments, transfers, and household 
savings at assumed fixed savings rate. Government demand is derived from an 
exogenously fixed level of real demand, allocated in fixed shares among a small number 
of sectors. Investment demand by sector is based on fixed shares of total investment 
after inventories. The last two components of final demand are increases in inventories 
and intermediate demand. Both demands are proportional to the level of output. 
  The above description of the demand system has ignored the origin of income for 
each agent. Households are assumed to receive all of the income from labour not sent 
abroad or paid to the government as taxes. Households also receive income from 
remittances from the ‘Rest of the World’ and certain transfers.  Transfers are assumed to 
be fixed in real terms. Since government consumption is fixed, government savings is 
assumed to be the difference between government revenues and consumption, taking 
into account interest payments, subsidies, and payments to the transfer account. 
Government revenue is the sum of various tax sources and transfers to the government. 
Closure between savings and investment is reached by defining investment being equal 
to savings. As a result, there is no independent investment function. Total savings are 
determined as a fixed share of household after-tax income, combined with government 
and enterprise savings. Enterprise savings are defined as a fixed fraction of after-tax and 
interest enterprise income. Government savings are defined as the difference between 
the fixed real level of government expenditure and government revenues from all taxes. 
  In the foreign exchange market, the exchange rate between the ‘Rest of the World’ 
and the EU is assumed fixed. Thus the exchange rates between Slovenia and the EU and 
the ‘Rest of the World’ shift proportionally. Foreign exchange market closure is 
obtained by assuming that the exchange rate with the EU is fixed. All inbound foreign 
transfers are assumed to be fixed in foreign currency. Outbound transfers are generally 
functions of income, though this varies from item to item. The two separate foreign 
exchange markets clear through changes in domestic prices and changing hard currency 
transfers from the ‘Rest of the World’ account to the EU account. The numéraire of the 
model is the exchange rate with the EU. 4
Many of the parameters in the model come directly from the 1998 SAM. The 
consumption shares are the shares of sectoral consumption in total household 
consumption. The intermediate uses coefficients are also derived directly from the 
SAM, just like the parameters for allocating investment expenditures among goods. 
While these and other parameters come from the SAM, certain behavioural parameters 
have to be obtained from other sources. These are primarily the various elasticities of 
substitution and transformation, used in the import and export functions. The parameters 
for price elasticities on the import side of the model are drawn from the GTAP model 
(Hertel, 1997). Since the AIDS function also requires income elasticities, we drew those 
from Buehrer (1994). For the purposes of the simulations in this model we used a value 
of 2.0 for the elasticity of transformation between domestic and aggregate export goods. 
The elasticities of transformation between exports to the EU and to the ‘Rest of World’ 
were assumed to be higher. 
 
3. Foreign Trade Liberalization in the Process of Accession of Slovenia to the EU 
 
In this chapter we analyze the levels and changes of the rates of import duties due to 
continued foreign trade liberalization process after 1998. These in fact cover the 
following: (1) full implementation of Free Trade Agreements in 2001; (2) the process of 
gradual adjusting of Slovenian Customs Tariff to the EU Common External Tariff for 
manufacturing products; (3) complete liberalization of trade with EU and candidate 
countries after the accession and (4) adoption of EU Common Customs Tariff and trade 
regime after the accession to the EU. The results obtained certainly show a relatively 
quick on-going process of foreign trade liberalization with the adoption of new customs 
system, the entrance into the GATT/WTO, signing of several FTAs and particularly of 
the European Agreement. High orientation of Slovenian economy towards foreign 
markets is revealed in the low paid tariff rates for the imports from the third countries. 
Full implementation of almost all agreements was finished in 2001. 
  Analysis of the average rates of collected import duties in the year 2001 shows very 
low figures at the aggregate level (1.2%), as well as at the level of imports from the EU-
15 (0.7%), candidate countries (1.2%) and third countries (2.5%). Outstanding results 
were found for the agricultural products, since in case of Europe and other FTAs they 
reveal that these products are subject of concessions only to some extent. And these are 
products for which we can expect the greatest trade diversion/creation effects after the 
accession of Slovenia to the EU
1. Theoretically, European and almost all other FTAs 
should be fully implemented at the beginning of 2001. Nevertheless, more than 11 bill. 
SIT were collected on the imports from the EU member states. The main reason can be 
found in the imports of agricultural products that contributed 8.8 bill. SIT of import 
duties. The group of products from other sectors that were imported without the use of 
preferential treatment within the European Agreement is also quite interesting, since for 
these products importers paid more than 2 bill. SIT of import duties. Obviously it was 
more simple (or even less expensive) to pay tariff according to the official Customs 




1 Lower average rates of import duties for imports from the third countries are primarily the outcome of 
different structures of imports of agricultural products. 5
In the year 2001 almost half of total import duties were collected on imports of 
products from EU15 and candidate countries. With the accession to the EU, Slovenia 
will loose these import duties. On the other hand, Slovenia collected 14.7 bill. SIT on 
products imported from other countries by the average rate of 2.5%. The use of the 
estimated rates of collected import duties on imports of the EU from the ‘Rest of the 
World’ on Slovenian structure of imports from the ‘Rest of the World’ did not change 
the average rate of import duties on the aggregate level by a high margin (from 2.50% 
to 2.37% only). Collected import duties would thus amount to 13.9 bill. SIT. 
Comparison of rates on the sectoral level reveal the most important changes in the 
sectors of food, beverages and tobacco industries and for furniture and other non-
covered products of manufacturing, for which rates will decrease substantially. 
  Estimated rates of collected import duties on Slovenian imports from the ‘Rest of 
the World’ countries together with the assumption of null rate for the imports from the 
EU15 and ‘Leaken’ group countries, estimated trade creation/diversion effects and 
growth rates of imports were than used for the estimation of values of traditional own 
resources that Slovenia will pay to the EU budget after the accession to the EU
2. Final 




It can be concluded that Slovenian traditional own resources payments in the period 
2004-2006 will be between 10.3 and 11.8 bill. SIT (in 1999 prices) or between 52.9 and 
60.6 mill. EUR (at 1999 exchange rate)
3. It can be concluded that continued process of 
foreign trade liberalization will cause substantial reduction of budget revenues based on 
import duties. Remained revenues based on import duties will represent 25% of import 
duties collected on the imports from the ‘Rest of the World’ countries. In 1998 budget 
revenues from import duties amounted to almost 48 bill. SIT (1999 prices) and in the 
year 2001 represented only a half of the 1998 amount (23.2 bill. SIT). With the entrance 
to the EU Slovenia will loose additional 9.5 bill. SIT because of the complete 
liberalization of imports from the EU and ‘Laeken’ group countries and additional 10.2 
bill. SIT transferred to the EU budget. Only 3.4 bill. SIT will remain for covering the 
costs of collection of import duties. 
  The estimates we arrived to using as real assumptions and data as possible are 
significantly higher from the first and also the last EU estimates, obtained using revised 
volume of Slovenian GNP (28-29 mill. EUR per year). Both EU estimates are using 
some very simplifying assumptions; the same share of import duties in the GNP as the 
average share of the EU member states, the same average rate of collected import duties 
as the average rate of import duties for the imports from the ‘Rest of the World’ 
countries in 2001, further decrease in this average rate because of future new 
preferential agreements being fully compensated with the future growth of imports and 
the existence of no trade creation/diversion effects. On the other hand we based our 
 
2 For complete presentation of the estimation of traditional own resources that Slovenia will have to pay 
to the EU budget see Majcen (2002). 
3 The assumption under which Croatia and FYR of Macedonia completely take advantage of the 
undersigned Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU would decrease the estimated 
traditional own resources payments to 8.2 – 9.8 bill. SIT or 44.3 – 50.7 mill. EUR. In reality, Croatian 
exporters could take advantage of preferential treatment for the minor part of their exports to the EU. It 
can thus be concluded that the estimated value would be closer to the higher amounts in Table 2, which 
do not take the SAA into account. 6
estimations on the eight digit CN levels taking into account our import structure from 
the ‘Rest of the World’ countries, using the share of collected/official rates of import 
duties for two groups of products (agriculture and other products). We further estimated 
the possible trade creation/diversion effects using the general equilibrium model of the 
Slovenian economy. We believe that taking all considerations into account, real 
traditional own resources for the period 2004-2006 will be much closer to our estimates 




It can be concluded that all direct effects of continued process of foreign trade 
liberalization have not been taken into account when the Slovenian net budget position 
was calculated. On one hand Slovenian budget revenues will decrease for additional 
41.5 – 65.7 mill. EUR in 1999 prices and on the other Slovenia will not pay only 29 
mill. EUR of traditional own resources to the EU budget each year, but from 52.9 to 
60.9 mill. EUR (see Table 3). 
 
4. Transfers between Slovenian Budget and the EU Budget 
 
Considering the negotiation process, which has been concluded on 13 December 2002 
in Copenhagen, it has to be stated that the real levels of transfers from both sides are not 
as obvious as might be seen at first glance. Namely, there are many different factors that 
will influence the final outcome in reality: (1) real growth rates of production and 
imports after the accession of Slovenia to the EU; (2) inflation rates; (3) exchange rate 
changes and (4) absorption capacity of the Slovenian economy. On the other hand we 
should take into account some additional ‘costs’ as well; Slovenia will have to pay 
funds to different EU institutions and will loose significant amount of VAT because of 
decreased efficiency of gathering the tax. Namely, according to Bole (2004) both 
average VAT revenue as % of GDP and VAT revenue as % of GDP per percentage 
point of standard VAT rate are higher in Slovenia than in the EU, while this is to be 
changed with the accession to the EU for three reasons: (1) openness of the Slovenian 
economy, (2) large amount of transactions between Slovenia and the EU and (3) 
smallness of the Slovenian economy
4. One should also take into account additional 
budget sources for compensating the difference between allowed subsidies and the 
actual payments from the EU budget in order to reach the complete volume of direct 
payments to the agriculture sector, as well as additional costs of establishing the 
external Schengen border. 
  It is obvious that when speaking about the Slovenian net budgetary position after the 
accession we should distinguish two positions. The first one is strictly considering only 
the flows between the two budgets, while the second one takes into account additional 
changes in Slovenian budget due to the accession. Considering both figures we can 
arrive to the estimate of direct impact of transfers on Slovenian budget. Of course, we 
should also have in mind that the accession to the EU will have a favourable positive 
 
4 The level of control of taxable persons for VAT is therefore to be decreased due to worsened 
communications between tax administrations of Slovenia and the EU member states after the abolishment 
of customs control; tax administrations of the Slovenian key trade partners are not likely to be prepared to 
supply the Slovenian tax administration with full information for the relatively small volume and value of 
trade, relative to the EU member states with the highest GDP per capita. 7
effects on Slovenian economy as well. Finally, we will be able to estimate direct and 




Regarding the flows between the two budgets it could be concluded that at the end 
of negotiations Slovenia succeeded to improve its positive net budgetary position from 
the one in 2003 (45 mill. EUR) to 81 mill. EUR for each year of the 2004-2006 period 
(see Table 4). With the added lump-sum cash flow and budgetary compensations 
Slovenian net budgetary position would be positive, arising to 0.32-0.34% of the GDP. 
This outcome has been realized due to the finally accepted corrections of the future 
GDP growth rates and revised volumes of GDP. Such a result certainly gives us some 
additional space in the (quite possible) situation of lower absorption capacity than 
assumed on basis of the resources from structural funds and for rural development. We 
should also be aware of the fact that the EU did not accept Slovenia’s estimations of 
traditional own resources to be paid to the EU budget. With the revenues lost due to the 
complete liberalization of foreign trade with the EU and other accession countries (see 
Table 3), quite favourable positive net budgetary position disappears. Adding already 
stated other additional costs and decreased budget revenues we arrive to the total direct 
impact of accession on the Slovenian budgetary position (Table 5). The figures were 
calculated in current prices using assumed 2% annual increase from the year 1999 on. 
The final outcome will probably be even less favourable if we take into account the fact 




It can be concluded that estimated total direct impact of the Slovenian accession on 
its net budget position will clearly be negative. Slovenian budget deficit will increase by 
155 mill. EUR in the first year of accession
5 and will amount to 0.6% of GDP. The 
greatest increase of deficit is expected in the second year after the accession (0.77%). Of 
course, we should have in mind that all these estimates are only partial, without taking 
into account the reactions of economic agents as well as the government. Further trade 
liberalization, increased domestic market and also the competition, lowered collected 
VAT and lowered transaction costs, will generate changes in domestic production, 
trade, employment, investment and consumption. What will be the final outcome is hard 
to conclude without an appropriate tool. In the next section we will thus try to prepare 
some simulations of possible complex effects of changes in Slovenian budgetary 
position after the accession to the EU, using a static computable general equilibrium 
model of the Slovenian economy. 
 
5. Results of the Simulations 
 
Simulations were prepared using the corrected version of computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of the Slovenian economy, based on SAM for 1998 (Majcen 
and Buehrer, 2001). Namely, we had to correct the ‘Rest of the World’ account by 
splitting it down into two separate accounts; the EU15 and ‘Laeken’ Group on one side 
 
5 If one month of postponement of VAT payments are taken into account as well, then the result for the 
year 2004 would be even less favourable. 8
and the ‘Rest of the World’ on the other. We also added a new institution in order to 
simulate transfers between the two budgets after the accession of Slovenia to the EU. 
The new version of the model was then used for simulations of the consequences of 
further foreign trade liberalization in the period after 1998 as the outcome of the 
finished process of implementation of FTAs and the European Agreement, adaptation of 
Customs Tariff to the EU and of Common External Tariff for the manufacturing 
products, adoption of the EU Common External Tariff after the accession of Slovenia to 
the EU and estimated transfers between both budgets. 
 
5.1. Foreign Trade Liberalization 
 
For the CGE model, data on collected import duties for both groups of countries (EU15 
+ ‘Laeken’ Group and the ‘Rest of the World’) for the base year 1998 and the year 2001 
were prepared. Additionally, estimated rates of collected import duties on imports from 
the ‘Rest of the World’, valid for the period after the accession 2004-2006, were also 
used. In Table 1 we present rates of collected import duties implemented within the 
CGE model. The main deficiency of the final estimates is certainly the use of only two 
shares of collected to official import duties. Results on sectoral level are therefore only 
rough approximations to be improved in the future. 
  The following three assumptions were used during the estimation of the levels and 
changes of rates of import duties applied within the CGE model: (1) final estimation is 
based on the estimated collected import duties for 2004; (2) valid foreign trade regime is 
reflected in the share of collected import duties compared with the official import duties 
(in the base year 1998 and in 2001) and (3) in 2001 applicable official rates of the EU 
Common External Tariff and estimated collected rates also reflect the situation in the 
analysed period of 2004-2006. With these assumptions in mind simulations were 
performed in two steps. Firstly, we estimated the effects of continued foreign trade 
liberalization due to the implementation of the European and other FTAs within the 
1998-2001 period, taking into consideration rates of collected import duties. New 
equilibrium solution for 2001 was then applied as a basis for comparison with the 
solution obtained in the second step of accession of Slovenia to the EU. 
  Simulations were performed using the estimated elasticities of substitution and 
transformation. Additionally, we tested the sensitivity of the model results on changes 
of the assumptions regarding the adaptation of wages or employment as well as 
regarding the possible reaction of the government to changed collected import duties. 
Decreased incomes can be compensated with decreased government consumption, 
savings or with the introduction of a new tax or increase of an already existing one. We 
assumed that government compensates lost revenues with increased value added tax; the 
CGE model was therefore adapted to obtain new equilibrium solution with the 
unchanged government consumption and savings, compensating the loss with an 
increase of the value added tax. All simulations (see Table 6) were performed using the 
assumption of fixed aggregated balance of payments (and variable balances for both 
foreign accounts), with the exchange rate with the EU being the numéraire.
<TABLE 6> 
 
The effects of the foreign trade liberalization due to the accession to the EU on the 
aggregate level are presented in Table 7. We only used the results with the assumed 9
possibility of change in employment. Simulations 1, 3 and 5 represent the outcome of 
further foreign trade liberalization and adoption of the EU Common Customs Tariff as 
well as its trade regime after the accession, regarding different possible reactions of the 
government to decreased revenues. Government was assumed to compensate decreased 
revenues either by decreasing consumption (Scenario 1), increasing VAT (Scenario 2), 
or by decreasing savings (Scenario 3). Revenues from the import duties were estimated 
to fall by 59% compared to 2001. Using this figure in order to compare the estimates of 
collected import duties after the accession (Majcen, 2002) we arrive to the estimate 




However, we should have in mind that for using the static model this outcome has 
only taken into account the trade creation/diversion effect due to changes in import 
duties and not real increase of imports in the 2001-2004 period. Complete liberalization 
of imports from the EU and candidate countries will decrease import prices and thus 
increase imports from these countries. To preserve unchanged balance of payments, 
exports should therefore also rise through decreased prices (partially as the outcome of 
decreased import prices of intermediate goods). Final outcome on the level of GDP and 
employment is slightly negative (–0.10 and –0.34, respectively) as well, mainly because 
of the assumed compensating decreased government consumption (–2.3%) and thus 
decreased production of non-market services (Scenario 1). 
  Another possible government reaction to decreased revenues is appropriate increase 
of one of the taxes. Here we assumed that VAT should change to the extent that 
government consumption and savings remain unchanged. The outcome of such policy 
on the economy is clearly negative; final necessary increase of VAT was estimated to be 
10% with the employment decreased by 2.5%, GDP by 1.6%, investment by 2.2%, 
exports by 2% and imports by 1.6%. Compensation with the government savings (–
30.9%) does not have a negative effect on aggregate employment and GDP. On the 
contrary, it shows positive effects of liberalization on trade, though again with 
decreased investment activity. In the Scenarios 2, 4 and 6 we added the estimated 
decrease of VAT collection (0.5% of GDP) in order to obtain the reaction of the 
economy
6. It can be concluded that assumed decreased rates indeed have a favourable 
positive impact on the economy, as expected. 
  If we sum up the results obtained regarding the (isolated) effects of foreign trade 
liberalization, it has to be concluded that the effects are indeed very sensitive to 
assumed reaction of the government. Insisting on unchanged government consumption 
through the adequate rise in the VAT rate will have clearly negative effects on the 
Slovenian economy. On the other hand, compensation with decreased government 
savings will have a negative impact on investment activity and thus lower growth rate of 
the economy as an outcome. In case we had used dynamic CGE model for the 
simulation of changes of particular aggregates compared with the steady growth of the 
economy, these negative effects on investment activity would have become obvious. It 
is therefore evident that a static CGE model can not provide the final answer regarding 
the effects of changes in the Slovenian budget. Namely, a great share of transfers is 
 
6 We assumed that the decrease of collected VAT is the outcome of decreased collection of the tax on 
imports of goods. The basic sector rates were then decreased accordingly and applied in the simulations.  10
connected with changes in structure and in the levels of investment activities and can 
have indirect effects on investment activity.  
 
5.2. Financial Flows between Slovenia and the EU after the Accession 
 
In this section we attempt to obtain some estimates of the complex effects of accession 
to the EU. Due to the static nature of the model the results obtained do not show 
complete short and long run effects, but are mainly focused on the short run outcome; 
short enough that changes in the investment activity can not affect the level of capital. 
Nevertheless, we try to capture some (medium run, at least) effects through the assumed 
decrease of transaction costs. 
  During the preparation of particular scenarios we tried to get as close as possible to 
the reality. We assumed that quantity of labour is variable, that government will try to 
preserve unchanged level of its consumption and savings, compensating the changes 
with the changes in the VAT rate. We did not make any changes in the structure of 
government consumption and in the structure of investment. Finally, eight scenarios 
have been prepared (see Table 8), starting with foreign trade liberalization and ending 
with complex set of transfers between both budgets, decreased collection of VAT and 




With the assumptions within the Scenarios 1 to 5 we tried to capture changes in the 
protection, the transfers between budgets and some additional costs Slovenia will 
acquire after the accession. We also added an estimate of decreased transaction costs 
using the estimates prepared for the EU member states (Emerson, 1988, p. 18). We 
continued with the assumed lower absorption capacity in order to get some notion of the 
possible effects of not so unrealistic outcome; no changes in transaction costs (to 
capture only the very short run effects) and the possibility of decreased government 
consumption. The results on the aggregate level are presented in Table 9. The results of 
first two scenarios were already presented in the previous section; possible positive 
effects of foreign trade liberalization disappear, if the government tries to preserve its 
unchanged consumption and savings with increased VAT rates. Estimated loss in 
collected VAT, on the other hand, does have a positive impact on the macro aggregates 




With the accession and the abolishment of borders in the next few years we can 
expect a decrease of transaction costs, where we assumed that this decrease will be 
equal to 2% of the value of trade with the EU member states
7. As transaction costs are 
 
7 Direct costs of frontier formalities and associated administrative costs of the private and public sector 
were estimated to be of the order of 1.8% of the value of goods traded within the Community (Emerson, 
1988, p. 18). With the abolishment of technical regulations and other non-border barriers this figure was 
estimated to be, on average, around 2% of enterprises’ total costs or 3.5% of industrial value-added. Of 
course, there are substantial differences between industrial and service branches subject to market entry 
restrictions that could experience considerably higher potential costs and price reductions of the order of 
10 to 20% and even more in some cases, e.g. energy, transport, office and defence equipment, financial 
services, and road and air transport sector. It is obvious that some very important effects of abolishment 11
not explicitly analyzed in the model, only import prices were corrected by 2%. The 
results obtained in Scenario 3 clearly point out a very positive impact; real GDP would 
rise by 2.2%, employment by 3.2%, exports by 5.5% and imports by 6.7% with trade 
diversion towards EU member states. Despite unchanged government consumption and 
savings, abolished import duties and decreased effective VAT rates, new equilibrium 
VAT rate remained almost unchanged (0.5% decrease, compared to the base solution). 
  We than proceeded to the introduction of officially estimated net outcome of 
assumed transfers between two budgets (0.33% GDP) and increased subsidies for the 
agriculture sector in the amount of 0.26% GDP. We did not make any corrections in the 
structure of government consumption or investments. Compared to the results obtained 
in Scenario 3 our results are even more favourable, as expected. Additional inflow of 
money at the unchanged government consumption and savings resulted in even lower 
VAT rates (–6.5%), resulting in higher competitiveness of the economy. 
  More realistic situation is certainly the fifth scenario with all additional transfers and 
payments from the Slovenian budget included. Results obtained are still positive with 
increased GDP, employment, investment and trade, despite the necessary increase of 
VAT tax to compensate all additional transfers and payments. But we can ask ourselves, 
what would happen if the absorption capacity is lower than assumed, e.g. 50% of the 
assumed. The fact is that the EU assumed much higher absorption capacity for the new 
member states for the use of structural funds than it was obtained for the existing EU 
member states; with the assumption of compensation of lower transfers through VAT, 
which has to rise by 15% and thus decrease the competitiveness of the economy. The 
final outcome show considerable decrease in almost all macro aggregates (with still 
positive changes), with the exception of decreased employment. 
  All former results could be regarded as the effects in at least medium or long run. 
Given the assumptions and the model used, they show positive net outcome of the 
Slovenian accession to the EU. But they are indeed quite sensible to the assumption of 
decreased transaction costs which will not be realised in a very short period. This was 
the reason for trying to comprehend the effects without decreased transaction costs 
(Scenario 7). Results obtained point to the fact that in the very short run a negative 
outcome of the accession should be expected if the government still wants to have its 
consumption unchanged and investment activities increased. In case that the 
government tries to behave more rationally and finds a possibility to decrease its own 
consumption (5% decrease is assumed in Scenario 8), this would greatly diminish 
negative short run effects. Results obtained therefore show the importance of the 
behaviour of the government in the short run after the accession to the EU; rational 
behaviour will certainly moderate possible short run negative effects of the accession 
and improve already favourable long run effects. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The main aim of the article has been the estimation of the effects of continued process 
of foreign trade liberalization and Slovenian net budgetary position after the accession 
to the EU, taking into account some additional important changes in Slovenian budget.  
For the simulations an adapted CGE model of the Slovenian economy has been used.  
 
of non-tariff barriers have not been taken into account. One possible way to capture them would be to 
incorporate estimated ad valorem equivalents for non-tariff barriers into the existing CGE model. 12
It can be concluded that continued process of foreign trade liberalization will cause 
substantial reduction of budget revenues based on import duties. Remaining revenues 
based on import duties will represent 25% of import duties, collected on the imports 
from the ‘Rest of the World’ countries. In 1998 budget revenues from import duties 
amounted to almost 48 bill. SIT, while in 2001 represented only half of the 1998 
amount (23.2 bill. SIT). With the entrance to the EU Slovenia will loose additional 9.5 
bill. SIT due to complete liberalization of imports from the EU and ‘Laeken’ group 
countries, and also additional 10.2 bill. SIT transferred to the EU budget. Only 3.4 bill. 
SIT will be left for covering the costs of collection of import duties. It is important to 
note that these estimates are higher than the estimates prepared by the EU. 
  Regarding the Slovenian net budgetary position after the accession two positions 
should be distinguished. The first one is strictly considering only the flows between the 
two budgets, while the second one also takes into account additional changes in 
Slovenian budget due to the accession. Regarding the flows between the two budgets it 
could be concluded that at the end of the negotiations Slovenia succeeded to improve its 
positive net budgetary position from that in 2003. With the added lump-sum cash flow 
and budgetary compensations Slovenian net budgetary position would be positive, 
arising to 0.32-0.34% of GDP. This outcome has been realized due to the finally 
accepted corrections of the future GDP growth rates and revised volumes of GDP. Such 
result certainly gives Slovenia some additional space in the (quite possible) situation of 
lower absorption capacity than assumed on basis of resources from structural and rural 
development funds. 
  On the other hand we should take into account decreased budget revenues due to 
complete liberalization of trade with the EU and candidate countries as well as 
decreased efficiency of value added tax collection. There will also be additional 
transfers to the EU institutions and increased costs due to the preparation of Schengen 
border with Croatia and ‘top up’ direct payments to farmers. Taking into account these 
figures we arrive to the total direct impact of accession on the Slovenian budget 
position, which will clearly be negative. Slovenian budget deficit will increase by 155 
mill. EUR in the first year of accession and will amount to 0.6% of GDP. The greatest 
increase of deficit is expected in the second year after the accession (0.77%). Of course 
we should have in mind that all these estimates are only partial, without taking into 
account the reactions of economic agents as well as the government. Further trade 
liberalization, increased domestic market and the competition lowered collected VAT 
and transaction costs, generating changes in domestic production, trade, employment, 
investment and consumption. 
  All results connected with decreased transaction costs could be regarded as effects 
in medium or (preferably) long run. Given the assumptions and the model used, they 
show positive net outcome of the Slovenian accession to the EU. But they are indeed 
quite sensible to the assumption of decreased transaction costs, which will not be 
realised in a very short period. Results obtained without the use of decreased transaction 
costs point to the fact that in the very short run a negative outcome of the accession 
should be expected, as long as the government still wants to have its consumption 
unchanged and investment activities increased. In case that the government tries to 
behave more rationally and finds a possibility to decrease its consumption, this would 
greatly diminish negative short run effects. Behaviour of the government is therefore 
crucial even in the short run after the accession to the EU, as rational behaviour will 13
certainly moderate possible short run negative effects of the accession and improve 
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Table 1.  Estimation of changes in rates of import duties after the adoption of the EU 
Common External Tariff (in 2001 prices) 
 
Situation in 2001  Accession to the EU
SECTOR 
EU15  ‘Laeken’ 
Group 
‘Rest of the 
World’ 
 
‘Rest of the World’ 
 
A 6.52 2.84 2.00  1.76 
B 2.16 0.96 2.39  1.36 
C 0.03 0.04 0.29  0.40 
DA 11.75  10.56 7.65  1.80 
DB  0.07 0.50 6.57  6.95 
DD  0.14 0.16 0.81  0.62 
DE  0.11 0.03 1.06  0.92 
DG  0.14 0.04 0.91  2.87 
DH  0.16 0.15 4.07  3.90 
DI  0.08 0.16 1.40  2.94 
DJ  0.08 0.05 0.85  2.51 
DK  0.16 0.35 3.29  1.59 
DL  0.20 0.27 1.73  1.00 
DM  0.13 0.08 5.71  5.49 
DN 0.27  0.38  10.08  3.50 
E 0.01 0.03 0.03  2.28 
Total  0.68 1.15 2.50  2.37 
Import duties (bill. SIT)  11.324  2.402  14.724  13.947 
Source: Import Customs Declarations for 2001; EU Common External Tariff; own calculations. 
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Table 2. Estimation of traditional own resources to be paid in the 2004-2006 period 
 
1999 (mill. SIT)  1999 (mill. EUR) 
SCENARIO 
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 
Accession of all 10 candidate countries   10266  11011  11769  52.9  56.7  60.6 
Source: Majcen (2002). 
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Table 3.  Corrections of the Slovenian net budgetary position due to complete liberalization of 
foreign trade with the EU and candidate countries and adoption of the EU Common 




2004 2005 2006 
1. Budget revenues  –41.5*  –63.6  –65.7 
2.  Transfers to the EU budget  –15.9*  –18.5  –21.3 
  3.     Total  –57.4*  –82.1  –87.0 
Note: Figures denoted by * refer only to eight-month period due to the date of accession of 1 May 2004. 
 
Source: Majcen (2002); own calculations 
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Table 4. Estimated net budgetary position for Slovenia after the enlargement of the EU
2004 2005 2006
EUR SIT % GDP %GNI EUR SIT % GDP %GNI EUR SIT % GDP %GNI
Pre-accession aid 51.0 9.9 0.22 0.22 43.0 8.3 0.17 0.17 27.0 5.2 0.10 0.10
1. Agriculture 43.4 8.4 0.18 0.18 124.6 24.1 0.50 0.51 158.2 30.6 0.61 0.61
1a. Common Agricultural Policy 14.9 2.9 0.06 0.06 65.2 12.6 0.26 0.27 71.6 13.9 0.28 0.28
Market measures 14.9 2.9 0.06 0.06 38.3 7.4 0.15 0.16 38.8 7.5 0.15 0.15
Direct payments 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 26.8 5.2 0.11 0.11 32.8 6.4 0.13 0.13
1b. Rural development 28.5 5.5 0.12 0.12 59.4 11.5 0.24 0.24 86.6 16.8 0.33 0.34
2. Structural actions after capping 27.0 5.2 0.11 0.11 59.2 11.5 0.24 0.24 72.8 14.1 0.28 0.28
Structural Fund 25.9 5.0 0.11 0.11 45.9 8.9 0.19 0.19 48.9 9.5 0.19 0.19
Cohesion Fund 1.2 0.2 0.01 0.01 13.3 2.6 0.05 0.05 23.9 4.6 0.09 0.09
3. Internal Policies 49.7 9.6 0.21 0.21 59 11.4 0.24 0.24 66.3 12.8 0.26 0.26
Existing policies 12.1 2.3 0.05 0.05 20.9 4.0 0.08 0.09 28.2 5.5 0.11 0.11
Institution building 2.0 0.4 0.01 0.01 2.5 0.5 0.01 0.01 2.5 0.5 0.01 0.01
Schengen 35.6 6.9 0.15 0.15 35.6 6.9 0.14 0.14 35.6 6.9 0.14 0.14
Sub-total (1 + 2 + 3) 120.1 23.3 0.51 0.51 242.9 47.0 0.98 0.99 297.3 57.6 1.15 1.15
Cash flow lump-sum 65.0 12.6 0.27 0.28 18.0 3.5 0.07 0.07 18.0 3.5 0.07 0.07
Total allocated expenditure 236.1 45.7 1.00 1.00 303.8 58.8 1.23 1.24 342.3 66.3 1.32 1.33
Traditional own resources 18.0 3.5 0.08 0.08 29.0 5.6 0.12 0.12 29.0 5.6 0.11 0.11
VAT resource 22.0 4.3 0.09 0.09 35.0 6.8 0.14 0.14 36.0 7.0 0.14 0.14
GNP resource 129.0 25.0 0.55 0.55 198.0 38.3 0.80 0.81 203.0 39.3 0.78 0.79
UK rebate 17.0 3.3 0.07 0.07 27.0 5.2 0.11 0.11 28.0 5.4 0.11 0.11
Total own resources 186 36.0 0.79 0.79 289.0 56.0 1.17 1.18 296.0 57.3 1.14 1.15
Net balance before budgetary compensation 50.1 9.7 0.21 0.21 14.8 2.9 0.06 0.06 46.3 9.0 0.18 0.18
Budgetary compensation 30.0 5.8 0.13 0.13 66.0 12.8 0.27 0.27 36.0 7.0 0.14 0.14
Net balance after budgetary compensation 80.1 15.5 0.34 0.34 80.8 15.6 0.33 0.33 82.3 15.9 0.32 0.32
Note: The calculations are based on revised GDP; 1999 prices, mill. €, mill. SIT.
Source: The Final Negotiation Results (2002); calculations by the Ministry of Finance, Budget Department (2002).18
Table 5. Estimated budget deficit of Slovenia after the accession to the EU (% of GDP)
2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
mill. EUR bill. SIT
Expected budget revenues 5.634 5.844 6.088 1.500 1.622 1.752
Expected budget expenditures 5.852 6.023 6.199 1.559 1.671 1.784
Expected budget deficit –219 –178 –112 –58 –49 –32
Expected budget deficit without the EU accession effect (%GDP) –0.97 –0.75 –0.45 –0.97 –0.75 –0.45
1. Expected transfers from the EU budget 294 417 435 68.4 97.0 101.1
2. Expected transfers from the Slovenian budget 205 324 340 47.8 75.8 79.2
3. Expected additional change of the budgetary position after the accession (T (3a...3f)) 243 309 303 57 72 71
3a. Expected decreased amount of collected VAT 0.5% of GDP) 83 133 142 19.4 31.1 33.2
3b. Obligations towards EU institutions 7 12 21 1.5 2.9 4.8
3c. Expected decrease of revenues from import duties 46 72 75 10.7 16.7 17.6
3d. ‘Top up’ payments of direct payments 23 19 14 5.2 4.3 3.3
3e. Schengen border 67 52 26 15.6 12.0 6.0
3f. Estimated additional transfers of collected import duties 18 21 24 4.1 4.9 5.7
4. Increase of budget deficit due to EU accession (1-2-3) –155 –216 –209 –36 -51 –49
Increase of budget deficit due to EU accession (% of GDP) –0.60 –0.77 –0.68 –0.60 –0.77 –0.68
Total estimated budget deficit –373 –395 –320 –94 –100 –81
Total estimated budget deficit (% of GDP) –1.56 –1.52 –1.13 –1.56 –1.52 –1.13
Source: The Final Negotiations Results (2002); calculations by the Ministry of Finance, Budget Department (2002); own calculations.19
Table 6. The scenarios of the CGE model for the analysis of trade liberalization 
between Slovenia and the EU 
 
SCENARIO  DESCRIPTION OF THE SCENARIO 
Scenario 1  Quantity of labour is variable (fixed wages), decrease of government consumption is 
equal to decreased revenues from import duties. 
Scenario 2  Scenario 1 + assumed decrease in collected VAT equal to 0.5% of GDP. 
Scenario 3  Quantity of labour is variable (fixed wages), government consumption unchanged, 
decreased revenues compensated with increased VAT. 
Scenario 4  Scenario 3 + assumed decrease in collected VAT equal to 0.5% of GDP. 
Scenario 5  Quantity of labour is variable (fixed wages), government consumption unchanged, 
decreased revenues compensated with decreased government savings. 
Scenario 6  Scenario 5 + assumed decrease in collected VAT equal to 0.5% of GDP. 20
Table 7. Some macroeconomic effects of foreign trade liberalization process in the period 2001-2004 (changes in %)
AGGREGATE SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO 6
Labour –0.34 0.55 –2.48 –2.07 0.05 1.05
Capital 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Import duties –59.03 –58.41 –60.43 –60.13 –59.11 –58.54
Government consumption –2.30 –2.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Government savings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 –30.89 –39.66
Investment –0.38 0.33 –2.19 –1.92 –2.05 –1.79
GDP –0.11 0.50 –1.59 –1.32 0.10 0.76
Exports (total) 1.10 2.56 –1.96 –1.19 0.92 2.33
– EU25 1.28 2.99 –2.22 –1.32 1.08 2.72
– others 0.65 1.53 –1.32 –0.87 0.53 1.37
Imports (total) 1.14 2.47 –1.63 –0.94 0.96 2.23
– EU25 1.17 2.53 –1.60 –0.88 0.96 2.25
– others 1.11 2.35 –1.66 –1.07 1.00 2.21
GDP deflator –0.73 –0.88 –0.05 –0.03 –0.65 –0.77
VAT 0.00 0.00 10.25 13.35 0.00 0.00
Note: Elasticities of substitution and transformation are taken from Buehrer (1994) and GTAP Data Base. Unchanged government consumption is obtained by the
increase of VAT (Scenarios 3 and 4).21
Table 8. The scenarios of the CGE model for the analysis of financial flows between 
Slovenia and the EU 
 
SCENARIO  DESCRIPTION OF THE SCENARIO 
Scenario 1  Further foreign trade liberalization due to the accession to the EU. 
Scenario 2  Scenario 1 + decreased VAT rate (0.5% of GDP). 
Scenario 3  Scenario 2 + decreased transaction costs (2% decrease of world import prices). 
Scenario 4  Scenario 3 + net transfers from the EU budget (0.33% GDP; 0.26% going to agriculture). 
Scenario 5  Scenario 4 + corrected payments of import duties, additional payments to the EU 
institutions, additional government investments due to the Schengen border, additional 
direct payments to farmers. 
Scenario 6  Scenario 5 + lower absorption capacity (only 50% of the estimated use of sources for 
rural development and sources from structural and cohesion funds). 
Scenario 7  Scenario 6 + no changes in transaction costs. 
Scenario 8  Scenario 7 + decrease of government consumption by 5%.  22
Table 9. Some macroeconomic effects of the accession to the EU (changes in %)
AGGREGATE SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 3 SCENARIO 4 SCENARIO 5 SCENARIO 6 SCENARIO 7 SCENARIO 8
Labour –2.475 –2.071 3.157 5.091 1.996 –0.449 –5.699 –0.928
Capital 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Import duties –60.43 –60.13 –58.48 –57.54 –59.08 –60.32 –61.97 –59.15
Government consumption 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 –5.000
Government savings 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.88 13.88 13.88 13.88 13.88
Investment –2.193 –1.915 2.166 4.230 3.025 1.018 –3.099 0.989
GDP –1.587 –1.322 2.192 3.485 1.443 1.018 –3.781 –0.440
Exports (total) –1.960 –1.190 5.451 6.951 3.467 1.007 –5.557 1.179
– EU25 –2.225 –1.321 6.357 8.054 4.009 1.181 –6.336 1.347
– others –1.321 –0.874 3.264 4.285 2.158 0.588 –3.677 0.775
Imports (total) –1.628 –0.936 6.631 8.838 5.343 2.464 –4.972 1.138
– EU25 –1.603 –0.879 7.871 10.092 6.589 3.693 –4.876 1.231
– others –1.660 –1.067 2.999 5.165 1.691 –1.140 –5.222 0.898
GDP deflator –0.050 –0.030 –0.285 –0.589 0.050 0.499 0.866 –0.723
VAT 10.245 13.347 –0.541 –6.489 5.741 15.157 30.618 5.760
Note: Elasticities of substitution and transformation are taken from Buehrer (1994) and GTAP Data Base.